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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction lies with the Utah Court of Appeals. A
formal administrative hearing was held on July 16, 2015
before the Adjudicative Hearing Office of J. Dennis
Frederick. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2) "[t]he
Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction . . . over a
final order . . . from a formal adjudicative proceeding of a
state agency . . . . "
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Statement of Issues Presented

The principal issue of the case, and this appeal, is
that Mr. Lopez contractually incorporated his decree of
divorce into his life insurance contract with the
Appellees, Utah State Retirement Board and Public
Employees' Group Term Life Program (hereinafter together
referenced as the "Life Program"), making his designation
of Ms. Welty irrevocable pursuant to the terms of the
incorporated contract.
The hearing officer erred in his interpretation of
Chapter 20, Title 40 of the Utah Code by denying Ms Welty's
request for payment of life insurance proceeds. The
principles of law and equity dictate that Ms. Welty was the
1

irrevocable beneficiary under Jesse Lopez's life insurance
policy. The Life Program paid the incorrect beneficiary
under a forbidden change of beneficiary form because Ms.
Welty had been designated an irrevocable beneficiary under
the terms of the incorporated contract. The hearing officer
ignored clear authority when he denied Ms. Welty's request
for payment of life insurance proceeds.
Title 49 Chapter 20 of the Utah Code provides general
guidelines for the state of Utah to create various group
insurance programs for state employees. At the state's
discretion,

these programs may be offered to various cities

to offer to city employees, at the city's discretion. Mr.
Lopez, Ms. Welty's ex-spouse and Jacob Lopez's father,
elected to participate in some of the offered programs
offered by his city employer.
The statute is general in nature and allows the state
to develop its own guidelines in offering and administering
these insurance products. The applicable guidelines to the
case at hand is known as the Life Program Group Term Master
Policy (the "Master Policy"). The Master Policy creates the
contractual obligations of the Life Program and the covered
employees. The Master Policy specifically allows for the
2

written statements of covered employees to be part of the
contract. Nothing in the Master Policy prevents a covered
employee from irrevocably designating beneficiaries, nor
does any provision permit the Life Program to administer
the contracts in contravention of a court order.
Unfortunately the findings of fact and conclusions of
law provide a scant record related to the hearing officer's
interpretation and application of title 49, the contractual
issues presented before the officer, or review of the
applicable case law. The record's deficiencies highlight
the need for this appeal. There are no findings of fact or
conclusions of law related to the incorporation of the
divorce decree into Mr. Lopez's life insurance contract.
There are no findings of fact or conclusions of law related
to Ms. Welty's argument about the forbidden nature of
subsequent change of beneficiary forms. There are no
findings of fact or conclusions of law related to the Life
Program's actions taken in contravention of a court order.
Standard of Review

The hearing officer's order relies on interpretation of
Title 49, Chapter 20 of the Utah Code. The Court of Appeals
reviews decisions related to interpretation of statute
3

under a "correction-of-error standard" and gives no
deference to the Board's interpretation under the Act. 1
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The following provisions are determinative to the
issues set forth in this appeal:
" (1 )

The program sh a 11 :

(a )

act as a s e 1 f - insurer of

employee benefit plans and administer those plans . . . . "
Utah Code Ann. 49-20-401(1) (a)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

The case stems from Ms. Welty's demand for payment of
life insurance proceeds on a life insurance policy upon the
death of Jesse Lopez. The life insurance policy was
administered by the Life Program. The facts are largely

1

See Hilton v. State Ret. Ed., 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 405,

2005 UT App 408

(Utah Ct. App. 2005); Epperson v. Utah

State Ret. Ed., 949 P.2d 779, 781

(Utah Ct. App. 1997);

O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Ed.,
(Utah Ct.App.1996), cert. granted,

929 P.2d 1112, 1114

939 P.2d 683 (Utah

1997); Allred v. Utah State Retirement Ed.,
1174 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
4

914 P.2d 1172,

'1·

agreed to by the parties.
The Life Program wrongfully paid life insurance
proceeds according to a forbidden change of beneficiary
form. Diane Welty and Jesse Lopez divorced in 1997 and, per
the divorce decree, Mr. Lopez was to "maintain in full
force and effect" a life insurance policy which designated
-

~

Diane Welty the irrevocable beneficiary for the benefit of
the children as long as child support was due.
Mr. Lopez complied with the decree by submitting a copy
of his divorce decree along with his beneficiary change
form to the Life Program, administered by the Life Program.
The submission of the divorce decree met all legal
requirements to incorporate the irrevocable designation of
Ms. Welty as beneficiary into Mr. Lopez's contract with the
life program. This incorporation by written statement was
specifically allowed by the terms of the Master Policy
which governs the contractual relationship between Mr.
Lopez and the Life Program. By attaching a copy of the
divorce decree, the Life Program was notified that the
beneficiary change was irrevocable under Utah law. The Life
Program was bound by the Third District Court ruling and
was contractually bound to abide by the irrevocable
5

language in the divorce decree. Utah law is clear that when
there is an irrevocable clause in a court-entered decree of
divorce, it must be obeyed. The Life Program was
contractually bound to designate Ms. Welty future
beneficiary until Mr. Lopez's youngest child reached an age
of majority.
During

the

formal

hearing,

the

administrator

of

the

Life Program declared that the PEHP has the authorization
to refuse forms based upon a number of factors. Any change
of beneficiary form submitted prior to the time Jacob Lopez
turned majority age was
and incorporation of

forbidden pursuant to court order

such

court

order

into

the

contract.

PEHP should have denied any attempts made by Mr.
anyone else,

to circumvent the parties'

Lopez,

or

contractual rights

or the court-entered divorce decree.
The

order

contrary

by
the

to

interpretation
limited

ability

insurance.
state

court

Her

of
to
only

related

the

Utah

State

principles
the

equity,

of

contract.

monitor
real

the

method

to Mr.

Retirement

First,

as
Ms.

beneficiary
was

Lopez's

to

of

file

obligations

Board

is

well

as

Welty

had

the

life

motions

in

under

the

divorce decree. She did so, and Mr. Lopez complied with his
6

obligation

by

providing

a

copy of

the

divorce

decree

to

designate Ms. Welty the irrevocable beneficiary to the life
insurance.
if

Mr.

Ms.

Lopez

Welty had no way of knowing,
decided

to

submit

a

or monitoring

subsequent

change

of

beneficiary form.
On the other hand, the Life Program had a simple method
of monitoring,

by simply making note on the file that the

beneficiary had been designated as
subsequent
Further,

attempts
the

children
for Mr.

to

life

reached

change

insurance

the

age

irrevocable and

the

was

beneficiary

in

place,

of majority,

to

Lopez's biological children. Mr.

his

son,

and

Ms.

Jacob,
Welty

were

State

Retirement

these

help

funds

support

Board's

benefit
student

loan

granted

benefit

of

from

Jacob's

mistake

the

of

significant
the

forms.

until

provide

life
debt

Lopez desired for

the

the

life

life

robbed

the

insurance

The

Jacob

insurance.

Utah

of

the

Jacob

has

Life
to

Jacob

insurance

education.

because

the

support

attend college and specified to

that

policy

intended

to

to

forbid

Porgram

the

wrong

person.
Course of Proceedings

Ms. Welty filed a request for board action after her
7

claim on certain life insurance proceeds was denied by the
Life Program. Ms Welty subsequently amended her request on
April 5, 2013. The case proceeded through the
administrative framework and was heard at a formal
administrative hearing on July 16, 2015. The parties
submitted stipulated facts and the only testimony taken at
the hearing was from Ms. Welty, Jacob Lopez, and Chris
Lamkin.
Disposition Below

The hearing officer ruled that the Life Program
conformed with the requirements of Title 49, Chapter 20.
The hearing officer did not offer a legal memorandum of his
decision and his decision contains very little citation to
statute or law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Stipulated Facts

The parties largely stipulated to the facts of the
case. The statement of Stipulated Facts is included in the
record page number 240. Ms. Welty and her son incorporate
the Stipulated Facts in their entirety and recite them
herein:
1.

Jesse

Ga vino

Lopez

("Mr.
8

Lopez")

was

employed by

Salt

Lake

City Corporation

("City")

and was

covered by a

group term life insurance policy offered to City employees
through the
Program.

Welty")
1997.

and

Lopez,

~

Life

petitioner,

Diane

Welty

( "Ms .

On

2.]

October

29,

ordered by Judge Pat B.
Salt Lake County, Utah.
4.

( "PEHP")

were married in August 1978 and divorced in October

[Id.

3.

Heal th Program

[R. 240, 1 1.]
Mr.

2.

Public Employees'

1997,

a

Decree

of

Divorce

was

Brian of the 3 rd District Court of
[Id.

1 3.]

In the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Lopez was ordered as

follows:
24.
That the Respondent currently has in force and
effect a life insurance policy on his life in the
face amount of $325,000.00.
That Respondent is
ordered to maintain in full force and effect said
life insurance policy until such time as the last
of the parties' children reaches age 18 or alimony
terminates, whichever is later. During the period
that the child support is due,
the Respondent
should be ordered to irrevocably designate the
Petitioner, as trustee for the minor children,
beneficiary on said life insurance policy. The
Respondent
should be
ordered
to
provide
the
Petitioner with proof that the insurance is in
effect within 30 days of entry of the Divorce
Decree
and
providing
verification
that
said
th
insurance is in effect by January 15
of each year
thereafter.
[Id.

1 4.]
5.
In July 1999, Mr. Lopez had coverage of $173,000.00
9

with the Life Program, of which $50,000.00 was funded by the

[Id.

City and the rest funded by Mr. Lopez.
6.

On

December

3,

1999,

Life Application from Mr.
29,

The

1999.

PEHP

~

5.]

received

a

Group

Term

Lopez dated on or about November

application

indicated

that

Mr.

Lopez

was

applying for $300,000.00 in Basic Group Term Life Coverage.
The application named Diane

(petitioner)

for minor children

as per attached divorce decree and Mary Ellen Lopez his wife
as secondary beneficiary.

Mr. Lopez's request for additional

coverage was cancelled in December 1999 based upon contact
from the City's Human Resources Department.
7.

On

December

3,

1999

the

Life

Beneficiary Change Form signed by Mr.
1999 which listed Petitioner,
children

as

per

beneficiary

and

beneficiary.

[Id.

8.

The

Mary

Life

~

Lopez

received

(petitioner)

divorce

Ellen

Program

a

Lopez on November 29,

"Diane

attached

[Id. 1 6.]

as

decree"

his

wife

for minor

as

primary
secondary

7.]
Program

received

a

written

copy

of

the

Decree of Divorce entered by the Third District of the State
of

Utah

on

October

29,

1997

Change Form submitted by Mr.
1999.

attached

to

the

Beneficiary

Lopez on or about December 3,

[Id. i 8.]
IO

9.

In

a

Verified

Response

to

Petitioner's

Order

to

Show Cause signed by Mr. Lopez on December 6, 1999, Mr. Lopez
provided the following:
a. On or about the 31 st day of October, 1997 this
Court entered a Decree of Divorce based upon
the entry of Respondent's default.
b. The Decree of Divorce contained a number of
misstatements of fact, some even inconsistent
with the terms of the Petition from which the
default was taken. Respondent was not provided
with a copy of the Decree of Divorce until long
after the time to set the default had expired
under Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P.
c. In
reality
Respondent
never
had
a
life
insurance policy on his life with a face amount
of $325,000.00.
d. At the time of divorce Respondent owned two
policies.
The first was a basic term policy
offered
through
his
employment
for
approximately $100,000.
The second was a
universal life insurance policy offered through
Allstate Insurance which insured his life for
only $50,000.00, and which also insured the
life of Petitioner for $50,000.00.
(See
Exhibit "A")
[Exhibit not included] .
Thus,
Respondent's factual burden to carry insurance
has always been approximately $150,000.00.

[Id.

l

10.

9.]

On

July

24,

2003,

the

Life

Program

received

an

Additional Group Term Life Employee Enrollment Form signed by
Mr.

Lopez on or about July 15,

2003.

additional coverage up to $300,000.

Mr.

Lopez applied for

The designated primary

beneficiary was Petitioner Diane Lopez, his ex-wife for minor
11

child

$300,000

Jacob

Lopez

per

as

change

form also

August

27,

divorce

contingent
reflects

In

Jacob

requirements,

his

and

This

Lopez's

Mr.

did

was

Petitioner
beneficiary

date

Lopez

he

son

of

birth as

not

complete

never

issued

the

[Id. 1 10.]

additional coverage.
11.

and

beneficiary.

However,

1988.

underwriting

decree

addition

to

the

Additional

Employee Enrollment Form on July 24,

Group

2003,

Term

Life

PEHP received a

Beneficiary Change Form signed on or about July 15, 2003, by
Mr.

The

Lopez.

beneficiary(ies)
and his

form

any previous

ex-wife Diane Lopez petitioner

On

nominations

and designated Mary Ellen Lopez,

October

of

his wife,

for minor child as

[Id. 1 11.]

primary beneficiaries.
12.

revoked

24,

2003,

PEHP

received

a

Group

Term

Life Change Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about October 21,
The

2003.

form

stated

in

relevant

part:

previous nomination or beneficiary ( ies),
the

following

indi victuals

upon my death." Mr.

to

receive

I

all

"Revoking

any

hereby designate
benefits

payable

Lopez designated Mary Ellen Lopez,

his

wife, as primary beneficiary and Joshua G. Lopez, his son, as
contingent beneficiary.
13.

On

March

20,

[Id. 1 12.]
2006,

PEHP
12

received

a

Group

Term

Life/Accident
Lopez

on

relevant

Plan

or

Beneficiary

about

part:

March

13,

"Revoking

beneficiary(ies),

Change
2006.

any

The

previous
designate

hereby

I

Form

signed
form

by

Mr.

stated

in

nomination
the

or

following

individuals to receive all benefits payable upon my death.
Mr.

Lopez designated Mary Ellen Lopez,

[Id.

beneficiary.

~

as primary

13.]

14.

Mr. Lopez died on July 9, 2006.

15.

Jacob Lopez was

17

[Id. 1 14.]

years old at

the

time

of Mr.

[Id. 1 15.]

Lopez's death.
16.

his wife,

n

On July 26,

2006,

PEHP received a Group Term Life

Program Claimant's Statement

from Mary Ellen Lopez.

[Id.

1

16. ]
17.
the

On or about August 2,

amount

of

$173,000.00

2006,
to

PEHP issued a check in

Mary

Ellen

Lopez,

the

beneficiary designated on the Group Term Life/Accident Plan
Beneficiary
Mar ch 13 ,

18.

Change

2 006 .

[ Id.

Form
~

signed

by Mr.

Lopez

on

or

about

17 . ]

The Life Program Group Term Life Master Policy

("Master Policy") is the contract between the Life Program
and its covered members.

[Id. 1 18.]

19. The Master Policy states:
13

PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
If a Subscriber and/or Dependent dies, the
Plan will pay to the beneficiary, subject to
the provisions set forth herein, the amount of
coverage for which the Subscriber and/or
Dependent is covered.

PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary . .
. . Any payment made in good faith pursuant to
this provision fully discharges the Plan to the
extent of the payment.
BENEFICIARY
A Subscriber shall designate a primary beneficiary
and a contingent beneficiary at the time of
application for coverage. A Subscriber may change
his or her beneficiary(ies) by filing a written
notice of the change with the Plan.
The change
will take effect as of the date the Subscriber
signed the notice of change . . . Any payment made
by the Plan in good faith pursuant to this
provision shall fully discharge the Plan to the
extent of such payment.
MODIFICATION
No change in this Master Policy shall be valid
unless approved by the Plan and unless approved by
the Plan and unless such approval is evidenced by
endorsement or amendment to this Master Policy.
No agent has authority to change this Master
Policy or waive any of its provisions.
NOTICE OF CLAIM
A written notice of claim must be given to the
Plan within (20) days after the death of a
Subscriber and/or Dependent unless it was not
reasonably possible to do so. Notice given by or
on behalf of a Subscriber and/or Dependent or his
beneficiary if any, to the Plan at its office in
Salt Lake City, Utah, with information sufficient
to identify the Subscriber and/or Dependent, shall
be deemed notice to the Plan.
14

TIME OF PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
Benefits payable hereunder will be paid as soon as
reasonably possible after receipt of an acceptable
written proof of loss together with all supporting
materials. . . .
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary.
If any payment remains unpaid at the death of the
beneficiary, or if the beneficiary is a minor or
is, in the opinion of the Plan, legally incapable
of giving a valid receipt and discharge for any
payment, the Plan, at its option, may pay such
benefit to any relative or relatives by blood or
connection by marriage of the Subscriber and/or
Dependent who is deemed by the Plan to be
equitably and legally entitled to receive the
payment. Any payment made in good faith pursuant
to this provision fully discharges the Plan to the
extent of the payment . . . .
LEGAL ACTION
No legal action may be brought against the Plan
for unpaid benefits until at least sixty (60) days
after written proof of loss has been furnished in
accordance with the requirements stated above. No
legal action may be brought after the expiration
of three years after the time written proof of
loss is required to be furnished.
ENTIRE CONTACT
This Master Policy, any modifications to it, and
the written statements, if any,
of
Subscribers,
constitute the entire contract.
[Id. 1 19.]
20. On August 28, 2012, Petitioner, Ms. Welty submitted
a notice of claim to the Life Program in which she presented
a

dispute

regarding

insurance coverage.

the
[Id.

distribution
':II 20.]
15

of

Mr.

Lopez's

life

21.

Ms.

Welty

indicated

that

Mr.

Lopez

had

a

life

insurance policy with Allstate Life Insurance in the amount
of $300,000.00 on or about October 29, 1997.
22.

[Id. 1 21.]

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-618 "All data in

the possession of the office is confidential, and may not be
divulged by the office except as permitted by board action."
Petitioners

were

not,

and

could

not

be,

supplied

with

beneficiary designation information until they brought this
[Id. 1 22.]

request for board action.
23.
Lopez

On

served

or
a

about

May

summons

Services and PEHP

1,

and

2012,

Diane

complaint

in Third District

to

Court

Welty
Utah
to

and

Jacob

Retirement

recover life

insurance proceeds paid by PEHP through the Group Term Life
Plan to Mary Ellen Lopez the designated beneficiary of Mr.
Lopez.

Mary Ellen Lopez was also named as a

this action.
24.
District

[Id. 1 23.]

On September 19,
Court

adjudication

Defendant in

2012,

against

because

the action brought in Third

PEHP

the

Court

was

dismissed

lacked

jurisdiction over the claims against PEHP.
submitted in the Third District Court,
indicated the following:

subject

without
matter

In a Declaration

Petitioner, Ms. Welty

Shortly after the death of my

"1 .
16

ex-husband,

Mr.

Lopez,

I

contacted Mrs.

Lopez regarding the

life insurance proceeds for my minor son,

2.

Jacob Lopez.

Mrs. Lopez told me that she had discussed the issue with her
attorney,
Jacob,

and

but

that

merely

she
had

did
to

not

list

have

to

pay

any money

Jacob

on

the

title

to

to
her

condo." [Id. 1 24.]
25.

Petitioners

filed

an

Amended

Request

for

Board

Action on April 5, 2013.
~

On September 3, 2013 Respondents waived all arguments
relating to barring claims pursuant to an applicable statute
of limitations.

[Id. 1 25.]

The following additional facts from the administrative
hearing are germane to the issues of appeal.
~

Additional Facts
1. Petitioners had power to determine that a submitted
change of beneficiary form is invalid.

[R. 299, 29:

125, 30: 1-8].
2. Jacob Lopez has taken out student loans to fund his

college education.

[R.

299, 16: 15-25].

3.Ms. Welty filed a motion for an order to show cause
against Mr. Lopez related to the requirement that he

17

carry life insurance and irrevocably designate Ms.
Welty as a beneficiary.

[R. 299, 8: 17-23].

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Master Policy allows covered employees to
incorporate written documents into their life insurance
contracts. Mr. Lopez was ordered, in a divorce decree, and
subsequently through a hearing on a motion for an order to
show cause, to irrevocably designate Ms. Welty as the
beneficiary of the life insurance until his biological
children reached the age of majority. The life program was
aware of this requirement because Mr. Lopez incorporated
his divorce decree into his contract with the Life Program
when he submitted a change of beneficiary form referencing
a divorce decree that was in fact provided with the form.
Mr. Lopez's incorporation of the divorce decree was
accepted by the Life Program and established his
contractual rights. Utah law recognizes a holder of a life
insurance contract's ability to irrevocably designate
beneficiaries. If the holder subsequently attempts to
revoke an irrevocable beneficiary, the change of
beneficiary is deemed forbidden and the insurance company
bears the risk of paying under a forbidden change of
18

beneficiary form.
Mr. Lopez's attempt to change his beneficiary to his
new spouse while his children were still minors was
forbidden. Because the Life Program had notice that Ms.
Welty was the irrevocable beneficiary, it breached its
contractual duties under the Master Policy by paying
pursuant to a forbidden change of beneficiary form. The
Life Program took the risk, and now should be responsible
to pay the proceeds of the life insurance contract to Ms.
Welty, for the benefit of Jacob Lopez.
This result is fair in law and equity. Ms. Welty was
legally unable to monitor the named beneficiaries of Mr.
Lopez's life insurance contract. Ms. Welty took the
necessary steps to force Mr. Lopez to irrevocably designate
her as beneficiary, for the benefit of the minor children,
of the life insurance contract. Ms. Welty accomplished just
that, yet the Life Program ignored the court-ordered
designation and paid pursuant to a forbidden change of
beneficiary form anyway.
Jacob Lopez, a minor child at the time of Mr. Lopez's
death, has borne the burden of the Life Program's mistake.
He has incurred substantial student loans in pursuit of his
19

education, one of the goals his father had set for him.

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD OVERRULE THE ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE
RETIREMENT BOARD BECAUSE JESSE LOPEZ'S INITIAL
BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION WAS IRREVOCABLE AND ENTITLED
PETITIONERS TO THE PROCEEDS OF THE LIFE INSURANCE
POLICY UNDER UTAH LAW.

I.

A. The Divorce Decree was incorporated by reference in
the Change of Beneficiary form submitted by Jesse
Lopez and is part of a binding contract between
Jesse Lopez and the Life Program.

Ms. Welty and Jacob Lopez are entitled to the proceeds
of Jesse Lopez's life insurance policy benefit through Life
Program because Jesse Lopez made the initial beneficiary
designation irrevocable by incorporating by reference the
Decree of Divorce, which required him to maintain a life
insurance policy with an irrevocable beneficiary designation
in favor of the Ms. Welty and her son. The Utah Supreme Court
echoes the coITu~on view that "the provisions of a divorce
decree control the disposition of the proceeds of an
insurance policy." 2 Utah's position seems to be the

2

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484,

197 5) .

20

485-486 (Utah

overwhelming majority stance. 3 Even when a life insurance

3

See e.g., Rollins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 912 F.2d

911 ( 7th Cir . 1 9 9 0 ) ( interpreting Indiana law)

( finding that

mandated beneficiaries of a divorce decree life insurance
provision have a vested right in certain proceeds of a
decedent's life insurance policy naming another person as
beneficiary when the decedent failed to comply with the
divorce decree; Tintocalis v. Tintocalis, 20 Cal. App. 4th
1590, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 659 (Cal. App. 1993)

("Where, as

here, the obligor spouse violates an order to maintain life
insurance, a constructive trust may be imposed."); Reeves v.

Reeves, 236 Ga. 209, 223 S.E.2d 112 (Ga. 1976)

(finding that

children mandated beneficiaries had vested interest in
certain proceeds of the decedent's life insurance policy);

Appelman v. Appelman, 87 Ill. App. 3d 749, 410 N.E.2d 199, 43
I 11 . Dec . 1 9 9 ( I I I . App . 1 9 8 0 ) ( finding that f o rrr.e r

wi

fe

mandated beneficiary was entitled to the imposition of a
constructive trust pertaining to proceeds of the decedent's
life insurance policy); Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233,
380 N.E.2d 189, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. 1978)

(imposing

constructive trust in favor of former wife mandated
21

policy's amount, policy number or even company are unclear,
the rights established by the divorce decree stand. 4

beneficiary); McKissick v. McKissick,
1366 (Nev. 1977)

93 Nev. 139, 560 P.2d

(finding that former wife mandated

beneficiary entitled to life insurance policy proceeds);

Thomas v. Studley, 59 Ohio App. 3d 76, 571 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio
App. 1989)

(finding that mandated beneficiary child entitled

to life insurance policy proceeds); Madsen v. Moffitt, 542
P.2d 187 (Utah 1975)

(finding that mandated beneficiaries

were entitled to certain life insurance policy proceeds);

Nielsen v. Nielsen, 535 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1975)

(finding that

mandated beneficiaries entitled to amount of life insurance
policy proceeds specified in the divorce decree). But see

Lock v. Lock, 8 Ariz. App. 138, 444 P.2d 163 (Ariz. App.
1968)

(finding that the mandated beneficiaries' only remedy

is an action against the decedent's estate for breach of the
divorce decree); Rindels v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 83 N.M.
181, 489 P.2d 1179 (N.M. 1971)

(finding that since no fraud

was shown, mandated beneficiaries were not entitled to
proceeds of life insurance policy).
4

See Madsen v. Moffitt, 542 P.2d 187, 188 (Utah 1975).
22

Under Utah law parties may incorporate writings that are
not written into the contract itself. The provisions of the
referenced writings become fully enforceable parts of the
contract. 5 Writings are incorporated by reference when they
are clear and unequivocal, alert the parties that the terms
are being incorporated, and the writing is easily available
to the parties. 6 The incorporated writing governs the
contractual relationship of the parties as if the writing was
included in the four corners of the contract. 7
In the instant case, the Life Program Group Term Master
Policy (the ''Master Policy'') is the contract between the Life
Program and its covered members. As discussed infra, the
statute under which the ac1.~inistrative judge made his ruling
grants the Master Policy broad discretion regarding the
formation of the contract between the Life Program and it's
covered members. Ultimately, the Master Policy, as formed and
accepted between the parties, is the contract that governs

5

Peterson

&

Simpson v.

IHC Health Servs.,

(Utah 2009).
6

Id.

7

Id.
23

217 P.3d 716, 721

the distribution of plan benefits. The Master Policy
specifically allows its covered members to incorporate
written statements as part of the contract. 8 The Master
Policy gives the covered member discretion to designate a
primary beneficiary and does not prohibit a covered member
from making beneficiary designation irrevocable.
The undisputed facts in this case establish that Mr.
Lopez incorporated the divorce decree into his contract with
the Life Program by meeting the factors required by state
law:

(1) the reference to the divorce decree was clear and

unequivocal,

(2) all parties were alerted that that the

divorce decree was being incorporated, and (3) the divorce
decree was easily available to the parties. 9
On December 3, 1999 Mr. Lopez submitted a Change of
Beneficiary form to the Life Program, in accordance with the

8

Stipulated Facts, R. 240,

244-45

Policy, and modification to it,

~

19 stating "This Master

and the written statements,

if any, of Subscribers, constitute the entire contract."
(emphasis added)
9

Peterson

&

Simpson v.

IHC Health Servs.,

(Utah 2009).
24

217 P.3d 716, 721

Q

terms of the Master Policy, which specifically listed the
beneficiary as "Diane (petitioner)

for minor children as per

attached divorce decree" 10 (emphasis added). By including "as
per attached divorce decree" in the beneficiary designation,
Mr. Lopez exercised the right to incorporate a written
statement that would govern his contractual relationship with
the Life Program. Mr. Lopez's written statement was clear
and unequivocal.
The parties were alerted to the reference. Mr. Lopez's
clear and unequivocal statement alerted all parties to the
incorporation of the divorce decree. The change of
beneficiary form on its face was insufficient to establish
who the beneficiary truly was under the life insurance. The
form did not contain a last name for "Diane" and referenced a
title of a party, "petitioner" that was not defined on the
change of beneficiary form. Nevertheless, the Life Program
did not reject the change of beneficiary form.

11

The

referenced divorce decree was necessarily incorporated and
the parties were aware of its necessity.

10

Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 241-42, 1 7.

11

Id. 1 7-9. See also R. 299, 29: 125, 30:1-8.
25

The divorce decree was available and in the possession
of all parties to the life insurance contract. 12 Mr. Lopez
provided a copy of the decree of divorce entered

by Utah's

Third District Court 13 by attaching a copy of the decree of
divorce to the Change of Beneficiary form, providing the Life
Program with the specific writing that he was referencing and
incorporating.
The Life Program is therefore bound by the decree's
terms. 14 In Peterson & Simpson, the court found that, even
though the parties did not have a copy of the incorporated
document, as long as it was easily accessible, the terms were
incorporated into the contract. 15 Even if the administrator
did not have a copy of the divorce decree in his hands, it
was easily accessible. Mr. Lopez's actions definitively
alerted the Life Program to the terms being incorporated.
Thus, pursuant to Peterson & Simpson, the Life Program is
bound by the incorporated decree even if they were unaware of

12
13

Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 242

Id.

~

~

8-9.

8.

14

See Peterson & Simpson, 217 P.3d at 721.

15

See. Id.
26

what the decree stated, chose not to read the decree, or
simply did not care to implement the decree. 16
The decree of divorce contained only one provision
related to life insurance policies. 17 This provision ordered
Jesse Lopez to" . . . irrevocably designate [Diane Welty], as
trustee for the minor children, beneficiary on said life
insurance policy." 18 The decree of divorce does not need to
specify the policy number, underwriter, or company with which
it is held for the divorce decree to dictate the terms of the
contract . 19 In Madsen v. Moffi tt 20 the court recognized
contractual obligations established by the decree of divorce
although the decree failed to provide specific and correct
facts.

In the instant case, the lack of specificity in the

decree does not alter the Life Program's obligation under the
decree to irrevocably designate Appellant, Diane Welty, as
beneficiary under the life insurance contract.

16

See Id.

17

See R. 301 Pl. Exhibit 1, Decree of Divorce, 1 24.

18

Id.; Stipulated Facts, R. 240,

19

See Madsen v. Moffitt,

20

Id.

241 1 4.

542 P.2d 187 (Utah 1975).

27

B. Changing an irrevocab1e beneficiary designation is

forbidden under Utah 1aw.

The Life Program was forbidden from processing any
change of beneficiary designation that altered the
irrevocable nature of the beneficiary designation.
Specifically, Utah law dictates that when a divorce decree
orders that a beneficiary be irrevocable, subsequent changes
of beneficiary are forbidden.

21

General principles of

insurance law concur that although an insured has the right
to change the designation of a policy's beneficiary, the
rights of a beneficiary designated pursuant to a divorce
decree become vested and are superior to those of any
subsequently designated persons. 22
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Lewis, the Utah Supreme
Court held that an attempted change of beneficiary whereby
the second wife was substituted for the first wife was

21

Id. at 485.

22

Dubois v. Smith,

599 A.2d 493, 497

(N.H. 1991)

(quoting

M. Rhodes, 5 Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law 2d § 28:36,
at 48, § 28:41 238-39 (Rev. ed. 1984) and J.A. Appleman and
J. Appleman, 2 Insurance Law and Practice§ 922, at 515-16
(1966)).
28

forbidden because the divorce decree between the husband and
the first wife ordered the husband to maintain a life
insurance policy with the first wife as a beneficiary and
three minor children as contingent beneficiaries. 23 After the
husband remarried, he changed the beneficiary of the life
insurance policy to his second wife. When the husband died,
the children and the second wife attempted to claim the
proceeds of the life insurance policy. The court held that
the provisions of the divorce decree controlled the
disposition of the life insurance policy, which rendered the
husband's attempt to change the beneficiary to his second
wife forbidden.
Utah contract law binds Respondents to perform in light
of the terms of the decree of divorce submitted by Mr. Jesse
Lopez. Any subsequent change of beneficiary forms were
forbidden and had no effect on Ms. Welty's contractual rights
disclosed and known by the Life Program on or about Decerober

3, 1999. 24
C.

Respondents were responsib1e to monitor the
beneficiaries under Utah 1aw and the Master

23

Travelers Ins. Co., 531 P.2d at 485.

24

See Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 241-42 1 7.

29

Policy.
The Life Program was responsible for reviewing and
approving any change of beneficiary designations submitted
by Mr. Lopez. PEHP is governed by Title 49, Chapter 20 of
the Utah Code. In part, the Life Program is required to
"act as a self-insurer of employee benefit plans and
administer those plans." 25 Part of administering plans is
reviewing and confirming change of beneficiary
designations. The Master Policy requires that all benefits
be payable to the beneficiary upon the death of a
subscriber. 26 Under Utah law, the insurance company runs the
risk of paying the policy twice if it pays pursuant to a
forbidden change of beneficiary. 27
Under Utah Civil Procedure, if a party to a decree of
divorce is non-compliant, the remedy is to seek an Order to
Show Cause from the court that issued the decree. 28 The
court will then take steps to determine compliance with the

25

Utah Code

26

See Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 244-45 1 19

27

Travelers Ins. Co., 531 P.2d at 485.

28

See Generally, Utah R. Civ. Pro. 101

§

49-20-401 (1) (a)

(2015).

30

decree and, if necessary, order the breaching party to
perform. 29 A party who seeks an order too often and without
cause can be liable for costs of the opposing party in
defending the action.

30

The determination of the validity of a Change of
Beneficiary form is solely within the Life Program's
power 31 • The Life Program was in the best position, and were
obligated to enforce the contractual rights established by
the decree of divorce. At the hearing held on July 16,
2015, Mr. Lamkin, Life Program Administrator, confirmed
that if a form was incomplete or illegible that PEHP has
the power to not honor the form or request more information
from the subscriber. 32 Under the terms of the Master Policy,
the Life Program has a duty to pay the beneficiary of a
policy. Just as it has the power and duty to review a
Change of Beneficiary form for completeness,

it accordingly

29

See id.

30

See Utah R. Civ. Pro. 73; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825.

31

Stipulated Facts, R. 240,

242-43

29: 125, 30:1-8.
32

R. 299,

30: 7-8
31

~

7-9. See also R. 299,

has the power and duty to verify that the change can be
made pursuant to any terms incorporated, such as a duly
incorporated decree of divorce.
Respondents could have, and should have, rejected a
Change of Beneficiary form that did not conform with the
incorporated Divorce Decree previously submitted by Mr.
Lopez. Ms. Welty attempted to verify the beneficiary
designation on the insurance policy through the Life
Program, but she was refused access to the information by
Respondents. Subsequently, she sought an Order to Show
Cause within the jurisdiction of the divorce proceedings in
the Third District Court to ensure Mr. Lopez's compliance
with the divorce decree. In November of 1999, Ms. Welty
took the extraordinary step of paying the costs associated
with moving the court for an order to show cause regarding
violation of the decree of divorce.

33

Mr. Lopez represented

to the court that he was compliant with paragraph 24 of the
decree because he had submitted the change of beneficiary
form to the Life Program naming Ms. Welty an irrevocable
beneficiary of that life insurance and providing a copy of

33

See Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 242 1 9.
32

the decree to the Life Program. The court found that to be
sufficient compliance.
Ms. Welty had no other recourse regarding enforcement
of the decree's requirement that she be named as the
irrevocable beneficiary to the life insurance held with the
Life Program by Mr. Lopez. A former spouse is not in a
position to verify the accuracy of a beneficiary
designation, nor should the former spouse have to if an
irrevocable beneficiary designation has been made.
Life insurance programs, in administering and
processing beneficiary forms, bear the risk of double
payment if they pay a beneficiary that replaced an
irrevocable beneficiary designation. Courts routinely order
parties to maintain life insurance policies with
irrevocable beneficiary designations to ensure support of
minor children if the obligor parent dies while the minor
children still rely on the obligor for support. 34 At the
time of Mr. Lopez's death, his son was still a minor and
relied on Mr. Lopez for support. Consequently, the Life
Program's payment of the beneficiary to anyone but Ms.

34

Nielson, 535 P.2d at 1240.
33

Welty violated the contract between Mr. Lopez and the Life
Program established by the incorporation of the divorce
decree. The Life Program's action also violated their
duties under Utah Code Ann. § 49-20-401(1) (a). The Life
Program should bear the risk of double payment because it
failed to properly administer the policy by ensuring that
the Change of Beneficiary forms comply with the
incorporated Divorce Decree.
II.

EQUITY FAVORS A FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE LIABLE TO
MS. WELTY AND HER SON FOR INSURANCE PROCEEDS PAID TO
MARY ELLEN LOPEZ FROM JESSE LOPEZ'S LIFE INSURANCE
POLICY.

In addition to the being entitled to legal relief
because of the Life Program's breach of contract, this Court
should find that the Life Program is liable to Ms. Welty as
the rightful beneficiaries under Jesse Lopez's life insurance
policy because it is the equitable result. The principles of
equity dictate the same result as the legal analysis for two
reasons: A) public policy concerns favor upholding an
irrevocable beneficiary designation pursuant to a divorce
decree, and B) the Life Program is the only entity or
person in a position to monitor beneficiary designations.
Further, Jacob Lopez has now born the cost of the Life
Program's mistake.
34

A.Public policy £avors honoring irrevocable bene£iciary
designation over any subsequent changes ma.de by the
subscriber as long as minor children are still
reliant on the subscriber £or support.

This Court should overrule the Order of the Utah State
Retirement Board because it violates strong public policy
in favor of utilizing irrevocable beneficiary designations
in divorce decrees to ensure support of minor children
after the death of a parent who is obligated to provide
their support. Courts often require an obligor parent to
provide life insurance to insure that support payments will
continue to be available in the event of the obligor
parent's death. 35 The State has a strong interest in
preventing children of dissolved marriages from becoming
charges of the State. 36 Courts have even held that children
from a dissolved marriage have an interest in life
insurance proceeds when the divorce decree required the
obligor parent to maintain insurance for the children and
the insurance policy did not name the children as
beneficiaries. 37

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Dubois, 599 A.2d at 497

(quoting J.A. Appleman and J.
35

The Order of the Utah State Retirement Board clearly
violates public policy in that it allows an obliger parent
to avoid the support requirements placed upon it through a
divorce decree, even when that obliger parent specifically
incorporates the divorce decree into the terms of a life
insurance policy.
It is undisputed that Mr. Lopez's son, Jacob, was still
a minor on the date Mr. Lopez died and was still dependent
upon him for support. 38 Courts have held insurance policies
liable for that support in circumstances with even less
documentation and support for the incorporation of the
divorce decree into the terms of the policy. Allowing the
Life Program to avoid payment on an irrevocable beneficiary
designation that was still in effect pursuant to the divorce
decree while Mr. Lopez had minor children sets a bad
precedent and flies in the face of well-established public
policy in favor of supporting minor children through life
insurance policies under a divorce decree.

Appleman, 2 Insurance Law and Practice§ 922, at 102
(Supp.1991)).
38

See Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 243 1 14-15.
36

B. The Li£e Program was the on1y entity or person that
cou1d monitor the beneficiary designations.
It is undisputed that Ms. Welty did not have access form
the Life Program regarding the beneficiary designation under
Mr. Lopez's life insurance. 39 The Life Program was the only
entity that could monitor the beneficiary designations. Ms.
Welty could not be expected to bear the cost of filing
motions orders to show cause to ensure that Mr. Lopez was
compliant with the divorce decree, Ms. Lopez had already
established that herself as the irrevocable beneficiary of
the life insurance through the judicial process and had a
reasonable expectation that the Life Program would abide by
the designation in the divorce decree.

C. Jacob Lopez has born the burden of the Life Program's
payment pursuant to a forbidden change of beneficiary
form.
There is no dispute that Mr. Lopez's son, Jacob, was a
minor at the time of Mr. Lopez's death. Ms. Welty and her son
still relied on Mr. Lopez for support at the time of his
death, and the life insurance policy was required to be
irrevocable for the purpose of ensuring support for his minor
children in the event of his death. Furthermore, Jacob and

39

See Stipulated Facts, R. 240, 245-46 1 22.
37

Ms. Welty testified at the hearing that Mr. Lopez had taken
out the life insurance policy to support Jacob through postsecondary education. They also testified that Mr. Lopez
desired that Jacob attend post-secondary education and
strongly encouraged him to do so.
Following his father's counsel Jacob is a recent college
graduate, seeking to continue onto master and possible
doctorate degrees. Now, Ms. Welty is retired and Jacob Lopez
is saddled with student loan debt, incurred because the life
insurance was not paid to the correct beneficiary. Ms. Welty
and her son were harmed because of the Life Program's breach,
and equity requires that the Life Program make Ms. Welty and
her son whole, even if the Life Program already paid the
policy proceeds to a subsequent, forbidden beneficiary.
CONCLUSION

The Court should overturn the Utah Retirement Board's
ruling and direct the Life Program to pay Ms. Welty for the
benefit of Jacob Lopez the proceeds from the life insurance
policy held by Mr. Lopez.
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SIGNATURE OF COUNSEL

Appellants respectfully submit the foregoing by and
through their undersigned counsel of record, Steven M.
Rogers, on this the 21st day of December, 2015.

. Rogers
pellants
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ADDENDUM

The Appellants do not believe that there is an
Addendum necessary as all referenced and necessary
documents are included in the Index of Record filed with
the Court on November 10, 2015.

(i)-
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellee requests oral argument in order to answer questions conce1ning
the arguments above.
DATED: December 21, 2015.
Huntsman I Lofgran, PLLC

Isl Steven M. Rogers
STEVEN M. ROGERS
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
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